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I.

INTRODUCTION

There are more than eighteen million public employees in the
1
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court
United States.
characterized public employees into dual roles—citizen and
2
employee. When public employees speak within the context of
their employment, their speech is not constitutionally protected,
even in cases where the expression addresses a critical issue
relevant to the public. Only when public employees speak as
private citizens is their speech entitled to full First Amendment
protection. Though many public employees enter the public sector
with the sole intention of serving their country, the latest Supreme
Court decision on this issue conveys a slightly contrary message:
public employees do not serve the public, they serve the United
States government.
3
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court ruled that public employees
are not entitled to First Amendment protection for statements they
4
make relating to their jobs. The impact of the Garcetti ruling
forces public employees who expose government misconduct to
rely on the federal and state statutory protections offered to
government whistleblowers.
Yet the inadequacy of these
protections is illustrated clearly by the facts in Garcetti: a county
prosecutor who informed his supervisor that a high-level public
official may have lied in an ongoing police investigation faced
5
retaliation for exposing this conduct, and he had no legal redress.
Sound strange? It is true.
While in recent years Congress and the American public have

1. The actual figure is 18,644,112 according to the December, 2005, U.S.
CENSUS REPORT. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND
PAYROLL, http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/05fedfun.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL, http://ftp2.census.gov/
govs/apes/05stlus.txt.
2. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1962.
5. Id. at 1955–56.
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been calling for increased protections for employees who speak out
6
about government wrongdoing, the Garcetti Court made a marked
move in the opposite direction. First, this note traces the evolution
of public-employee free speech rights, including a discussion of the
7
most salient cases preceding Garcetti. Second, it reviews the facts,
holding, and reasoning of the Appellate Court decision in Garcetti,
and moves to the majority and dissenting viewpoints of the
8
Supreme Court on review. Next, it maintains that the reasoning
employed by the majority in Garcetti departs from the Court’s
9
analysis in previous modern public-employee free speech cases.
The note then argues that the Garcetti ruling runs contrary to the
interests of all relevant stakeholders—the employer, the employee,
10
and the public. The note concludes by arguing that federal and
state whistleblower protections must be enhanced to provide
11
adequate protections to public employees.
II. HISTORY
A. Rights of Public Employees Prior to 1967
For much of the twentieth century, it was well-settled that the
government, as an employer, could restrict the free speech rights of
12
its employees. The constitutional analysis of public-employee free
speech was known as the rights-privilege doctrine: government
employment was a privilege and those fortunate enough to receive
such employment had to tolerate certain limitations on their rights
6. Press Release, Carl Levin, United States Senator, The Federal Employees
Protection of Disclosures Act (June 10, 2003), available at http://levin.senate.gov/
newsroom/release.cfm?id=216635 (“Whistleblowers play a crucial role in ensuring
that Congress and the public are aware of serious cases of waste, fraud, and
mismanagement in government. Whistleblowing is never more important than
when our national security is at stake.”).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220–21, 29 N.E. 517,
518 (1892) (holding that the government could impose reasonable restrictions on
its employees as a condition of employment); Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing
Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1010–11 (2005) (“[T]he thrust of
the Supreme Court’s public employee speech jurisprudence was easy to discern
. . . . If you wanted to make sure you kept your job, your best bet was to button
your lip.”).
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13

to speak freely.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the
government’s responsibility for maintaining an efficient public
service and, to that end, deferred to a government officer’s
14
judgment to impose restrictions on public employees’ freedoms.
In 1947, the Supreme Court cited with approval the reasoning of
Justice (then Judge) Oliver Wendell Holmes, that “[t]he petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
15
constitutional right to be a policeman,” making it clear that the
government can discipline a public employee for statements that,
had they been spoken by a private citizen, would have enjoyed
constitutional protection. In so doing, the Court accepted the
argument that public employment was not a right or entitlement,
16
but rather, a privilege that could be subject to restrictions.
17
In 1952, in Adler v. Board of Education of New York, the United
States Supreme Court again affirmed its ruling that public
18
In Adler,
employees were subject to reasonable restrictions.
several public school teachers brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of New York’s Feinberg law, a sedition law enacted
to implement and enforce two earlier laws that made the utterance
of certain statements or membership in subversive organizations
19
adequate grounds for dismissal.
The Adler Court declined to
overturn the law and held that the authorities had not only the
right, but also the duty, to maintain the integrity of the public
13. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (discrediting the
rights-privilege doctrine as gratuitously dividing between right and non-right).
14. United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947).
15. Id. (quoting McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517).
16. See id. at 99–104; Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in
the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1987).
17. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
18. Id. at 492.
19. Id. at 486–90. The pertinent parts of the laws are as follows: “A person
employed as superintendent of schools, teacher or employee in the public schools,
in any city or school district of the state, shall be removed from such position for
the utterance of any treasonable or seditious word or words or the doing of any
treasonable or seditious act or acts while holding such position.” N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 3021 (McKinney 2001). The second law makes persons seeking public
employment ineligible for such employment if they themselves advocate the
overthrow of the government by force or illicit means or are in any way related to
an organization that advocates a government takeover by force or illegal means.
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 105(1) (McKinney 1999). The statute made clear that
membership in the Communist party constituted prima facie evidence of
ineligibility. Id. § 105(1)(c).
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schools. The Court also said that no constitutional principles were
violated by inquiring into the reputation and the associations of
current and prospective employees to determine their fitness for
20
employment and loyalty to the State. The Court opined that it
was “clear that . . . persons have the right under our law to
assemble, speak, think and believe as they will,” but that they do
21
not retain these same rights when they work for the State. By this,
the Court reaffirmed its previous holding that public employment
22
was a privilege, and that First Amendment rights of public
employees were not absolute.
23
Yet Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion in Adler expressed
dissatisfaction with the Court’s handling of public-employee
jurisprudence, and in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Court’s
24
opinion on the issue began to change. In a series of opinions, the
Court foreshadowed its pivotal 1967 decision in Keyishian v. Board of
25
Regents, where it rejected the rights-privilege doctrine and
26
overruled Adler entirely. In Keyishian, several university professors
20. Adler, 342 U.S. at 493.
21. Id. at 492.
22. Id.
23. I have not been able to accept the recent doctrine that a citizen who
enters the public service can be forced to sacrifice his civil rights. I
cannot for example find in our constitutional scheme the power of a
state to place its employees in the category of second-class citizens by
denying them freedom of thought and expression. The Constitution
guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our
society. All are entitled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher.
Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963) (holding that the
state cannot withhold government benefits because an employee refused to
comply with an employment regulation that conflicted with her religious beliefs).
“It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may
be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”
Id. at 404. See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897 (1961)
(acknowledging constitutional restraints on the government in dealing with its
employees and recognizing that the federal and state government could not deny
employment for “arbitrary or discriminatory” reasons such as membership in a
particular political party); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)
(pronouncing unconstitutional a state’s requirement that its officers proclaim a
belief in the existence of God); Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190–91
(1952) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute that required employees to swear
oaths of loyalty to the state as a condition of employment).
25. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
26. Id. at 605–06 (stating that “the theory that public employment which may
be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected” (adopting the lower court’s language)
and “constitutional doctrine which has emerged since [the Adler] decision has
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again challenged the constitutionality of New York’s Feinberg law
after being terminated for refusing to sign the Feinberg certificate
27
saying that each was not a Communist. The Court stated that
“[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity” and held that public employment could not be
28
conditioned on the surrender of constitutional rights. The Court
also recognized that placing unreasonable restrictions on public
employees was not compatible with the First Amendment
29
guarantees of free speech. Yet the Supreme Court’s abolition of
the rights-privilege doctrine left a void in First Amendment
30
jurisprudence: what exactly was the extent of public employees’
First Amendment rights? The Court answered this question just
31
one year later when it decided Pickering v. Board of Education.
B. The Pickering Doctrine
With the landmark ruling in Pickering v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court began to draw substantive boundaries on the free
32
speech rights of public employees. Public school teacher Marvin
Pickering was terminated after sending a letter to the local
newspaper criticizing the school board and the district
33
superintendent for their handling of a bond issue proposal. At
Pickering’s dismissal hearing, the Board alleged that Pickering’s
statements were inaccurate, harmful to the reputation of the
34
Board, and controversial within the school district.
The lower courts rejected Pickering’s claim on grounds that it
35
had already been rebuffed by the United States Supreme Court.
rejected its major premise. That premise was that public employment . . . may be
conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be
abridged by direct government action.”). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 13.
27. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 592.
28. Id. at 604–06.
29. See id.; Stephen Allred, Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech
Rights of Public Employees, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 434 (1984).
30. See Massaro, supra note 16, at 11.
31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32. See generally id. at 573–75 (examining the respective interests before
setting forth the balancing test).
33. Id. at 565–66.
34. Id. at 566–67.
35. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1967). The lower courts
essentially reverted back to the rights-privilege doctrine and asserted that “[b]y
choosing to teach in the public schools, [Pickering] undertook the obligation to
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But on review, the Supreme Court again made clear that it was
unconstitutional to compel public employees to completely
36
relinquish their free speech rights as a condition of employment.
The Court recognized the competing interests: on the one hand sat
the intrusion upon public employees’ constitutional guarantee of
free speech, and on the other hand sat the State’s interest in
limiting its employees’ free speech rights to effectively serve the
37
citizenry.
The decision resulted in what became known as the “Pickering
balancing test”—an approach designed to weigh the relative
38
employee and employer interests.
The Court recognized the
“enormous variety of fact situations” in which teachers or other
public employees might speak critically of their employers,
39
resulting in their termination. As a result, it declined to articulate
a “general standard” that could be used to judge the employees’
40
statements. But the Court did provide some guidelines for lower
courts to consider in determining whether a public employee’s
41
speech was constitutionally protected. The guidelines included
the following factors: the parties’ working relationship, the
potential for creating disharmony among co-workers, the
likelihood for disrupting normal work operations, and the need for
42
confidence and loyalty.
The Court also considered the value to the general public of
robust and uninhibited debate on matters of public concern,
particularly the value of Pickering’s opinion, given his position as a
43
teacher in the district.
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community
most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to
refrain from conduct which in the absence of such position he would have an
undoubted right to engage in.” Id. at 6. The lower court went so far as to liken
the termination of a public employee for exercising his or her free speech right to
the termination on the basis of incompetence, malice, negligence, immorality, or
other illicit conduct. Id.
36. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
37. “The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.” Id.
38. Id. at 563.
39. Id. at 569.
40. Id. at 568.
41. Id. at 569–73.
42. Id. at 571, 573.
43. Id. at 571–72.
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how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should
be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to
speak out freely on such questions without fear of
44
retaliatory dismissal.
The Court concluded that Pickering’s right to speak out and
contribute to public discourse as any other member of the
community might do outweighed the school administration’s
45
interests in restricting its teachers’ speech. The Court in Pickering
thus created a new doctrine whereby an individual employed in the
public sector did not sacrifice his or her First Amendment rights
merely by virtue of public employment. Rather, the Court held
that proper approach was to strike a balance between the interests
46
of all the parties—employer, employee, and the public.
47

C. Post-Pickering to Connick v. Myers

Over the next fifteen years, the Supreme Court heard several
48
cases regarding the rights of public employees; its decisions in
these cases also marked an expansion of their First Amendment
49
rights. In 1972, the Court heard Perry v. Sindermann, in which a
junior college professor alleged retaliation for speaking critically of
50
the Board of Regents’ stance on a particular school policy. Citing
Pickering, the Court concluded that Perry’s public criticism of the
44. Id. at 572.
45. Id. at 573.
46. The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1738, 1739
(1984) (stating the Supreme Court has recognized that the interests of at least
three parties—the employer, the employee, and the public—are relevant to the
process of determining the constitutional rights of public employees.).
47. 461 U.S. 139 (1983).
48. This note does not include an examination of the Supreme Court’s
rulings in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974). In Roth, the court did not address the employee’s First
Amendment right, but rather framed the issue as whether Roth had a
constitutional right to receive a hearing and statement of reasons regarding the
college’s decision not to re-hire him. In Arnett, the sole issue was whether the
plaintiff was denied due process upon termination under the standards
established by the Lloyd-La Follette Act. But to the extent that these opinions
include statements which are helpful in understanding the Court’s attitude toward
public-employee free speech rights, the cases may be cited.
49. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
50. Sindermann was elected President of the Texas Junior College Teacher’s
Association. Id. at 594. In this role, he spoke publicly against the Board’s
opposition to a proposal that would elevate the college to four-year status. Id. at
595. The Board refused to renew his employment contract on the basis that he
had acted insubordinately. Id. at 594–96.
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Board was constitutionally protected, and it precluded his
51
termination on that basis.
In 1977, a teacher brought suit against his school district
employer, alleging that the district violated his free speech rights
when it denied his tenure in retaliation for certain untoward
52
actions.
The Court ruled that if the teacher was successful in
proving his speech was principally responsible for the employer’s
decision, then the burden shifted to the employer to prove it would
have taken the same action, the employee’s speech
53
notwithstanding.
Finally, in 1979 in yet another case involving a teacher’s
termination, Bessie Givhan brought suit against the school district
that fired her after she complained to the principal about the
54
school’s racially discriminatory policies.
The Supreme Court,
again citing Pickering, reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
55
decision and held that public employees do not forfeit their First
Amendment rights if they choose to convey their concerns in
56
private, rather than in public.
D. Connick v. Myers: The Two-Tiered Test
For more than a decade, the Pickering balancing test remained
relatively unaltered. But in 1983, the Supreme Court issued a
ruling that significantly narrowed the rights of public employees,
57
tipping the “balance” in favor of public employers. Sheila Myers,
51. Id. at 598 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
52. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
The events preceding the adverse employment action against Doyle included
getting into a fight with another teacher, and with the school’s cafeteria workers,
referring to students as “sons of bitches,” making an obscene gesture towards
other students, and sending an internal memorandum with information on
teacher dress and appearance to a local radio station. Id. at 281–82.
53. Id. at 287.
54. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411–13 (1979). The
school district argued that Givhan was terminated, in part, for being “arrogant”
and “unreasonable” in conversations with the principal, for being disruptive, and
for giving white students’ papers lower grades. Id. at 412 n.2. But the district
court concluded that the main reason the school did not renew Ms. Givhan’s
employment was because of her criticism of the school’s policies and practices. Id.
at 412.
55. Id. at 413–14.
56. Id. at 414–16.
57. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 139 (1983); Pengtian Ma, Public Employee
Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to
Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 121, 122–23 (1996) (explaining
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an Assistant District County Attorney in New Orleans, drafted and
circulated a questionnaire to her colleagues which sought
information about the work environment, including one question
pertaining to whether employees felt pressured to participate in
58
political campaigns.
In response, Myers was terminated for
59
insubordination. She brought suit alleging that the termination
60
violated her First Amendment rights.
The Connick Court acknowledged the danger in thwarting
61
public employees’ free speech rights, but asserted that the
Pickering Court’s emphasis on “the right[s] of a public employee ‘as
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern,’ was not
62
accidental” and reflects the “common-sense realization that
government offices could not function if every employment
63
decision became a constitutional matter.”
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court reasoned that the
historical development of public employees’ First Amendment
rights, coupled with the government’s interest in promoting an
efficient public service, compelled the conclusion that if the
employee’s speech does not constitute speech on a matter of public
64
concern, judicial review is unnecessary. By so stating, the Court
erected an initial threshold inquiry regarding the public
employee’s speech in question before proceeding to Pickering
65
balancing test. To determine whether a statement constituted a
matter of public concern, the Court explained that the “content,
66
form, and context” should be considered. Citing with approval a

that the law has recently evolved to ensure free speech by public employees only
when the speech touches upon a matter of public concern); see also Clifford P.
Hooker, Commentary, Balancing Free Expression and Government Interests: Connick v.
Myers, 15 W. EDUC. L. REP. 633, 633-34 (1984) (stating that “Connick is the only
recent Supreme Court opinion to uphold a government employer’s act of
terminating an employee because of her criticism of her supervisors”).
58. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140–41.
59. Id. at 141.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 144–45 (“[T]he precedents in which Pickering is rooted . . . sought to
suppress the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs. The issue
was whether government employees could be prevented or ‘chilled’ by the fear of
discharge from joining political parties and other associations that certain public
officials might find ‘subversive.’”).
62. Id. at 143.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 146.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 147.
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previous opinion by Justice Powell, the majority reiterated:
[T]he Government, as an employer, must have wide
discretion and control over the management of its
personnel and internal affairs.
This includes the
prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders
efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged
retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory
employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the
work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the
67
efficiency of an office or agency.
Accordingly, the Court afforded “a wide degree of deference
to the employer’s judgment” to assist the government in effectively
68
In light of this, the Court
carrying out its responsibilities.
concluded that Myers’ survey constituted an employee grievance,
even though one of the survey questions addressed a matter of
69
public concern. Thus, her termination did not infringe upon her
70
First Amendment rights.
While the dissent sharply criticized the majority’s ultimate
71
holding, it did not expressly reject the majority’s ruling on the
72
threshold inquiry. Thus, Connick refined the Pickering balancing
test by concluding that, as an initial inquiry, it must be determined
whether the public employee’s speech is related to a matter of
73
public concern.
If not, the employee’s speech is not
74
constitutionally protected. If so, only then should the Pickering
75
balancing test of competing interests become relevant.

67. Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
68. Id. at 150–52.
69. Id. at 149.
70. Id. at 154.
71. Justice Brennan authored the dissenting opinion in which Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. at 156. He differed with the majority
in three respects. First, he argued that by using the context factor to determine
whether the employee’s statement relates to a matter of public concern and then
using it again to establish whether the speech negatively impacted the employer,
the majority alters the balancing by weighing that factor twice, rather than once.
Id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Next, he asserted that Myers’ survey was on a
matter of public concern. Id. at 163. Finally, he argued that extreme deference to
the government employer is not desirable when assessing the impact of a public
employee’s critical speech. Id. at 168.
72. See id. at 156 (majority opinion).
73. Id. at 146.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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E. Post-Connick
Since Connick, the Supreme Court has remained faithful to the
76
77
framework of Pickering and Connick. In Rankin v. McPherson, the
Court had its first opportunity to apply the Pickering/Connick
combination. In that case, McPherson was fired for making a
78
statement unrelated to any aspect of her job. The Court held that
statements unrelated to an employee’s job duties warranted the
Pickering balancing test, so long as the statement addressed a matter
79
of public concern. The Rankin Court’s reasoning closely followed
the analysis set forth in Connick; that is, it examined the “content,
form, and context” factors of McPherson’s speech to answer the
80
threshold public concern question.
It concluded that her
statement did, in fact, address a matter of public concern, and
proceeded to weigh the relevant factors, whether McPherson’s
speech: impaired the government’s ability to effectively perform its
necessary functions, interfered with the normal operations of the
agency, created disharmony in the work environment, negatively
impacted McPherson’s work performance or job responsibilities, or
81
made it difficult for her superiors to effectively discipline her.
The Court resolved the balancing test in McPherson’s favor and
held that her First Amendment rights prevailed over the
82
government’s interests.
83
In Waters v. Churchill, the Court framed the issue as whether it
should apply the Connick test to what it believed a public
employee’s speech to be, or whether the trier of fact should discern
what the speech actually was before proceeding to the Connick
84
threshold inquiry followed by Pickering balancing test.
In a
plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that a public employer
76. Kozel, supra note 12, at 1017.
77. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
78. Id. at 381–82. McPherson held an administrative position in a law
enforcement office. Id. at 380–81. After hearing on the radio that an assassination
attempt had been made on President Reagan, she offhandedly told her colleague
and boyfriend, “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.” Id. at 381.
79. Id. at 386–87.
80. Id. at 384–85.
81. Id. at 388.
82. Id. at 392.
83. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
84. Id. at 664, 668. In Waters, a public hospital terminated Churchill after
hearing that she made critical comments about her supervisor. Id. at 666.
Churchill disputed that the conversation took place as the hospital alleged. Id. at
666–67.
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could terminate an employee based on what the employee
85
supposedly said, so long as the employer’s belief was reasonable.
By so ruling, the Court precluded the factfinder from hearing
evidence and deciding for itself what was said, thus again narrowing
public employees’ free speech rights.
86
And in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, the
Court ruled on the constitutionality of a congressional enactment
that prohibited federal employees from accepting honoraria for
87
making an appearance, giving a speech, or writing an article. The
government argued the ban should be upheld because of the
possibility of workplace disruption and because of the potential
88
decline in its operational efficiency.
But citing the valuable
contributions made by public employees, coupled with the public’s
89
right to be informed of such views, the Court imposed a heavier
90
burden on the government to prove the ban was necessary. The
91
government could meet that burden, and as a result, the Court
92
ruled that the ban was unenforceable.
Before Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court’s most recent decision
involving public-employee free speech came in City of San Diego v.
93
John Roe. In that case, Roe, a police officer, sold videotapes over
the Internet which portrayed him engaging in sexually explicit acts
94
while wearing his police uniform.
After being fired, he sued,
95
The
alleging the termination violated his free speech rights.
Supreme Court employed the conventional Pickering/Connick
analysis and considered its holdings in two previous invasion of
85. Id. at 677–80.
86. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
87. Id. at 458.
88. Id. at 470.
89. Id. “The large-scale disincentive to Government employees’ expression
also imposes a significant burden on the public’s right to read and hear what the
employees would otherwise have written and said.” Id. (referencing Va. Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976)).
“We have no way to measure the true cost of that burden, but we cannot ignore
the risk that it might deprive us of the work of a future Melville or Hawthorne.”
Id.
90. The Court justified this additional burden by reasoning that its previous
decisions in public-employee free speech cases involved just one employee,
whereas the statute in question applied to thousands of public employees’
expressions. Id. at 466–68.
91. Id. at 479.
92. Id. at 480.
93. 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
94. Id. at 78.
95. Id. at 79.
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96

privacy cases to establish whether Roe’s speech regarded a matter
97
Without difficulty, the Court resolved the
of public concern.
threshold public concern inquiry against Roe, and did not even
reach the Pickering balancing test; as a result, the case was
98
dismissed.
F.

Summary of Legal History

The Court’s early jurisprudence regarding the free speech
rights of public employees underwent a dramatic change beginning
in the 1950s and 1960s. The Court’s landmark ruling in Pickering v.
Board of Education laid the groundwork for the expansion of public
employees’ free speech rights, subject to a balancing test that
accommodated the government’s dual roles of sovereign and
99
employer. These roles impose conflicting responsibilities: on the
one hand, the government, as sovereign, is obliged to its
constituents to uphold their ability to engage in free and open
debate, the essence of the First Amendment; on the other hand,
the government, as employer, must provide its citizens with public
services, and the practical realities associated with carrying out
these functions justify some boundaries on public employees’ free
100
speech rights.
This balancing test remained in place until the early 1980s,
when Connick v. Myers refined the test to eliminate First
101
Amendment protection for speech of a purely personal nature.
The Connick decision narrowed the instances in which public
employees’ speech would be protected and perhaps marked a new
pro-employer era characterized by affording great deference to the
government’s role as employer and its corresponding duties.
The Court’s rulings in Rankin, National Treasury Employees
Union, Waters, and Roe did not disturb the Pickering/Connick line of
reasoning. But the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether a
public employee’s speech within the scope of his or her
96. Id. at 83–84 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) and
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) (stating that “public concern is
something that is . . . of legitimate news interest [or] of general interest . . . to the
public”)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 84–85.
99. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
100. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672 (1994); Lewis v. Cohen, 165
F.3d 154, 161 (2d. Cir. 1999).
101. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 139 (1983).
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employment received First Amendment protection. Would the
Court preserve the Pickering calculus, or would the Court opt for
another rule? The circuit courts were split on this issue, but the
Supreme Court resolved the disagreement in Garcetti v. Ceballos.
III. GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS
A. Facts of the Case
Richard Ceballos was employed as a Deputy District Attorney
102
in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office. In 2000, he
was contacted by a defense attorney regarding People v. Cuskey, a
103
The
case being prosecuted by the District Attorney’s office.
defense attorney believed there were inaccuracies in the affidavit of
a deputy sheriff who obtained a search warrant crucial to the
104
prosecution’s case.
The defense attorney notified Ceballos that
he planned to challenge the warrant, and asked Ceballos to review
105
the case, a customary aspect of Ceballos’s job.
Ceballos visited the location described in the affidavit and
determined there were serious discrepancies between what
Ceballos had seen and the statements the deputy sheriff made in
106
order to obtain the search warrant.
Particularly alarming to
Ceballos was the fact that the deputy sheriff had called a “long
driveway” what Ceballos deemed to be an entirely separate
roadway, and the fact that the deputy sheriff had described tire
tracks at the crime scene, but Ceballos concluded that the street’s
composition made it nearly impossible for tire tracks to have
107
remained visible.
Ceballos spoke with his immediate supervisors, Carol Najera
and Frank Sundstedt, about his investigation and all agreed that
108
the search warrant may have been improperly obtained. Ceballos
wrote a memorandum to his supervisors outlining his findings and
109
recommended that the case be dismissed.
On March 9, 2000,
102. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
103. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled by
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951.
104. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
109. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955–56.
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Ceballos, Najera, Sundstedt, representatives from the Sheriff’s
office, and another deputy district attorney met to discuss the
110
situation.
The meeting was apparently quite intense, and one
lieutenant criticized Ceballos about the way he had handled the
111
matter.
Instead of heeding Ceballos’s recommendation to dismiss the
case, Sundstedt believed it prudent to wait until the court ruled on
112
the motion challenging the warrant. After informing the defense
attorney that Ceballos believed the deputy sheriff had lied to obtain
113
the warrant, Ceballos was subpoenaed to testify for the defense.
Ceballos informed Najera that, pursuant to his obligation under
114
Brady v. Maryland, he had no choice but to provide the defense
115
with a copy of his memo regarding the investigation.
At the
hearing, the prosecution objected to numerous questions by the
116
defense attorney.
The judge sustained these objections, and
therefore, Ceballos was not allowed to reveal his opinion on the
117
legality of the warrant. The judge denied the defendant’s motion
118
and the prosecution continued with its case. Because he testified
on behalf of the defense, Ceballos was not permitted to remain a
119
part of the prosecution’s team for this particular case.
After these events, Ceballos maintained that Garcetti, the Los
Angeles County District Attorney, Najera, and Sundstedt retaliated
against him for writing the memo regarding the deputy sheriff’s
ostensible misconduct, for notifying the defense counsel about his
120
investigation, and for testifying at the motion hearing.
Ceballos
asserted that the retaliatory actions included a demotion, a transfer
121
to a less desirable office,
and hostile treatment from his
110. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
111. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
112. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
113. Id.
114. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
115. The duties to which Ceballos referred were delineated in Brady. See id.
(holding that the prosecution’s suppression of evidence favoring the accused is a
violation of due process where the evidence may be relevant in determining either
guilt or punishment).
116. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. In 2001, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky conducted an independent study
of the Los Angeles Police Department, specifically regarding the Rampart scandal,
in which police officers attempted to convict innocent civilians on criminal

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/8

16

Harris: Case Note: Silencing the Noise of Democracy the Supreme Court Den
13. HARRIS - RC.DOC

2007]

4/10/2007 1:05:51 PM

SILENCING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

1159

122

immediate supervisors.
Ceballos filed an employment grievance, but this was denied
123
for lack of evidence that he had experienced any retaliation. He
then brought suit in the district court, asserting that the adverse
employment action constituted a violation of his First Amendment
124
rights.
The county moved for summary judgment, arguing that
its decisions regarding Ceballos’s employment were made to
accommodate its staffing demands, and, moreover, Ceballos’s
memo did not necessitate First Amendment protection because it
125
was made in the normal course of his employment.
The district
court ruled in favor of the county on the basis of qualified
126
immunity and Ceballos appealed.
B. The Appellate Court’s Decision
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals followed closely
the reasoning set forth in the Pickering/Connick line of cases: “To
determine whether Ceballos’s speech is protected by the First
Amendment, we apply a two-step test that stems from the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of
127
Education . . . .” The test is, of course, to first determine whether
Ceballos’s speech was related to a matter of public concern, and, if
it was, to weigh the relative interests required by the Pickering
balancing test.
In determining whether Ceballos’s speech addressed a matter
of public concern, the majority viewed the crucial factor as whether
the employee’s intent in speaking was to draw attention to
wrongdoing, or rather to gain ammunition on a wholly personal
128
matter.
If the former, then the next step was to engage in the
charges by planting evidence and committing perjury. His report observed that
transferring police officers to other assignments, typically far away from where the
officers lived, was a relatively common practice to punish disloyal police officers.
The officers referred to this practice as “freeway therapy.” Erwin Chemerinsky, An
Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the
Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 549 (2001) (analyzing the Board of
Inquiry’s report and setting forth conclusions and recommendations). Ceballos
describes his transfer as such an act. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1172, 1172 n.2.
122. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171–72.
123. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1956 (2006).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1173.
128. Id. at 1174 (quoting Roth v. Veteran’s Admin. of United States, 856 F.2d
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Pickering calculus, and if the latter, then the speech was not worthy
of First Amendment protection. The majority easily resolved this
issue in Ceballos’s favor for two reasons: first, it stated that when
public employees make statements relating to “corruption,
wrongdoing, misconduct, wastefulness, or inefficiency . . . their
129
speech is inherently a matter of public concern;” and second, the
county itself did not contend that Ceballos’s statements related to a
130
purely personal matter.
The defendants argued that Ceballos should not receive First
Amendment protection because his statements were made
131
pursuant to his employment responsibilities.
In his concurring
opinion, Judge O’Scannlain said that the pertinent consideration
under Connick was not whether the speech in question addressed a
matter of public concern, but whether the person spoke as a citizen
132
or as an employee.
Under this reasoning, the speaker’s role is
dispositive in the analysis of whether the speech is protected. To
support his argument, Judge O’Scannlain cited numerous federal
circuit court cases in which the citizen-employee distinction was
133
discussed,
but he conceded that Connick did not explicitly
134
mention this point.
Judge O’Scannlain offered three reasons for adopting a broad
rule excepting all job-related speech from First Amendment
protection. First, he believed that public employees’ speech while
on the job belonged to the State with no corresponding interest in
1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1174, 1193 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
132. Id. at 1187.
133. Id. at 1187–88 (citing Gonzalez v. City of Chi., 239 F.3d 939, 942 (7th Cir.
2001) (declining to establish a broad rule exempting job-related speech from First
Amendment protection but holding that, absent “a unique set of facts[,]” public
employees’ speech while performing routine job-related duties lack First
Amendment protection); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (adopting a per se rule that public employees’ speech related to their
employment does not receive First Amendment protection); Buazard v. Meridith,
172 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a public employees’ “purely jobrelated” speech does not receive First Amendment protection)).
134. See id. at 1187.
Connick did not fully rationalize the distinction it drew between
speech offered by a public employee acting as an employee carrying out
his or her ordinary job duties and that spoken by an employee acting as a
citizen expressing his or her personal views on disputed matters of public
import.
Id.
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the speech itself by the public employee, except in doing a good
135
job. Second, he reiterated Connick’s concern that the judiciary is
not the proper forum to resolve each and every employee grievance
lamenting that “with . . . Ceballos on the books, what federal or
state employment-based decision can possibly evade intrusive
136
federal constitutional review?”
Finally, he noted that legislatures
had enacted whistleblower statutes to afford legal protections to
public employees who expose government wrongdoing, and thus
137
judicial protections were both misguided and redundant.
The majority expressly rejected Judge O’Scannlain’s proposal
to fashion a per se rule that would exempt job-related speech of
138
public employees from First Amendment protection.
First, the
court reasoned that public employees are well-positioned to speak
on matters of public concern and, as a result, declining to offer
them First Amendment protection for reporting government
misconduct would diminish the public’s ability to maintain the
139
integrity of government operations.
Second, the majority
attacked the claim that public employees have no personal stake in
their speech and recognized that for many public servants, their
jobs mean much more than just a paycheck, but also reflect a desire
140
to advance the public good.
Next, they noted the absurdity of
denying public employees protection for exposing wrongdoing to
their supervisors, but granting them protection if they choose to
circumvent the established channels and go directly to the
141
public.
Finally, the majority surveyed the other circuit court
rulings on the matter and found ample support for its view that
public employee job-related speech remains subject to the two142
tiered Pickering/Connick test.
135. Id. at 1189.
136. Id. at 1190.
137. “This case [exemplifies] the too-common tendency of well-intentioned
jurists to squeeze a policy-oriented square peg into a round constitutional hole
. . . . With such Platonic Guardians, who needs elected representatives at all?” Id.
at 1192–93.
138. Id. at 1175.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1175 n.5.
141. Id. at 1176.
142. Id. at 1176–77 (citing Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a hospital employee’s memo on patient care is protected speech
despite the employee’s role as director of quality management and stating as
“incorrect” the proposition that an employee’s statement in the course of his or
her job duties is never protected); Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 644–45 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that a police officer’s report on police brutality addresses a matter
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Having resolved that issue in Ceballos’s favor, the majority
143
It found no
moved on to perform the Pickering balancing test.
significant interest on the part of the county worthy of
144
protection, and therefore held Ceballos’s speech to be protected
145
under the First Amendment.
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The issue before the Court was whether public employees’ job146
related statements were entitled to First Amendment protection.
In a 5–4 ruling, the majority promulgated Judge O’Scannlain’s view
that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official employment responsibilities, their speech is not protected
147
by the First Amendment.
1.

The Majority Opinion

Justice Kennedy began the opinion by asserting that for many
148
was the rights/privilege
years, the “unchallenged dogma”
doctrine, but that this doctrine had been qualified by the Pickering
Court to provide protection of certain statements for two reasons.
First, the majority acknowledged that public employees should not
forfeit all their First Amendment rights simply because they
149
And second, the majority
accepted government employment.
recognized the societal benefits of hearing the well-informed

of public concern and stating that the notion that an employee spoke pursuant to
his or her job responsibilities is a relevant factor, but not the determinative
factor); Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (permitting constitutional
protection for a police officer’s statements in a memo to his supervisors and
expressly rejecting a per se rule that would exempt statements made pursuant to
job-related duties from First Amendment protection); Baldassare v. New Jersey,
250 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that an investigator’s speech about the
potential misconduct of other employees constituted protected speech
notwithstanding that his role as an investigator involved disclosing such
behavior)).
143. Id. at 1180.
144. “[B]ecause the defendants have failed even to suggest disruption or
inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney’s Office, there is little for us to
weigh in favor of the individual defendants under Pickering.” Id.
145. Id.
146. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
147. Id. at 1960. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer filed dissenting
opinions. Id. at 1962–76.
148. Id. at 1957 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
149. Id. at 1957, 1958.
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opinions of public employees regarding public issues.
But the
majority downplayed Pickering’s importance in employee-speech
jurisprudence and referred to that Court’s decision as a “starting
151
point” in the analysis. The majority understood its predecessor’s
primary purpose as affording public employers the necessary
control over their employees so as not to impair its public service
152
mission.
The majority also believed that the premise
underscoring its decisions in previous public-employee free speech
cases was to allow public employees free speech rights with respect
153
to public debate rather than to job-related activities.
It asserted
that “[r]efusing to recognize First Amendment claims based on
government employees’ work product does not prevent them from
participating in public debate. The employees retain the prospect
of constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic
154
discourse.”
Relying on these principles, the majority stated that the
dispositive factor was that Ceballos’s statements were made
155
pursuant to his job duties.
They argued that Ceballos was not
speaking as a citizen when he complained about the deputy
156
sheriff’s conduct, but rather as an employee of the government.
The majority reasoned that, because Ceballos was a government
employee, it was irrelevant whether he had some personal interest
in speaking out against the deputy sheriff; the crucial point was that
the government has the right to limit what its employees say while
157
they are serving in their official government capacity.
The
majority drew a sharp distinction between Ceballos as citizen and
Ceballos as government employee. As a citizen, Ceballos had the
same First Amendment rights as a member of the general public.
But as a government employee, Ceballos did not have the right to
150. Id. at 1958–59.
151. Id. at 1957.
152. See id. at 1958. “The Court’s overarching objectives, though, are
evident. . . . Government employers, like private employers, need a significant
degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would
be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.” Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1960.
155. Id. at 1959–60. “The controlling factor in Ceballos’ case is that his
expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.” Id. The
Court later says, “The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to
Ceballos’ official duties.” Id. at 1960.
156. Id. at 1959–60.
157. Id. at 1960.
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do as he pleased; rather, the majority held that the government, as
employer, can control its employees’ job-related expressions
158
without infringing on their right to free speech.
The majority
believed that its ruling sufficiently preserved public employees’
First Amendment rights while also accommodating the
government’s interest in effectively managing its work environment
159
in order to perform critical government functions.
The majority also appeared quite concerned with the prospect
of every disgruntled employee seeking judicial review of an adverse
160
employment decision.
To eliminate this potential problem, it
held that the Pickering balancing test is activated only when the
speech in question is uttered by the public employee, as a citizen,
and not when the speech falls within the scope of the employee’s
161
job responsibilities.
While the majority recognized the need to expose
governmental ineffectiveness and transgressions by its officers, it
seemed content to leave that task to the sensible judgment of the
government itself and the whistleblower statutes available to
162
government employees who report misconduct.
2.

The Dissenting Opinions

Justice Souter’s dissent began by concurring with the
majority’s stated interest in effectively serving the citizenry, thus
disallowing public employees from making inflammatory or
163
But he asserted that
inciting statements about their employers.
on balance, the employee’s interest in expressing his or her
opinion about the government’s misconduct, and the public’s
interest in hearing his views, overshadowed the government’s
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 1961 (“Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule, adopted by the Court
of Appeals, would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and
intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and
among government employees and their superiors in the course of official
business.” Id. at 1962. “Our precedents do not support the existence of a
constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public employee makes in
the course of doing his or her job.” Id.).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1962.
163. See id. at 1963–64 (Souter, J., dissenting). “The reason that protection of
employee speech is qualified is that it can distract co-workers and supervisors from
their tasks at hand and thwart the implementation of legitimate policy . . . .” Id. at
1964.
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164

efficiency interests.
Justice Souter noted that in two previous cases, the statements
that led to the employees’ termination were related to the
employees’ job duties, and the Pickering balancing test was deemed
165
appropriate. He observed that in Givhan and Madison, the Court
did not draw a distinction between the individual as citizen and the
individual as employee; quite the reverse, the Court recognized
166
that the two are often united.
Justice Souter identified several incongruities in the majority’s
ruling. First, contrary to the majority’s opinion, he contended that
the need to engage in the Pickering balancing test of interests was
arguably more important when employees made statements related
to their job duties because of the benefits to both the individual
and the public from that speech, and also because the employees
167
are speaking on matters that they understand best.
Next, he
called it “odd” that the majority’s ruling would deny protection to a
school human resources officer who criticized a principal’s
unwillingness to hire minorities, whereas a teacher or secretary
168
would be protected when making the same complaint.
Second,
he argued it was even “stranger” to refuse to protect an employee
who utilized the chain of command to voice his or her concerns
about potential violations, but afford protection to that same
169
employee if he chose to take the matter directly to the public.
Finally, he believed that the majority incorrectly differentiated
between the individual as a citizen and the individual as an
employee, and observed that the best public servants are those who
do not make a distinction between their civic lives and their
170
professional lives, but rather, merge the two together.
Justice Souter reiterated his concurrence with the majority on
an important point: that the government requires “civility . . .
164. Id. at 1963–64.
165. Id. at 1964 (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410
(1979) (following Pickering when the district fired a teacher for complaining about
employee racial composition) and Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8, v. Wis.
Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (stating that Pickering should
be followed when a teacher spoke out on his on behalf at a school board
meeting)).
166. Id. “[A] public employee can wear a citizen’s hat when speaking on
subjects closely tied to the employee’s own job . . . .” Id. at 1964.
167. Id. at 1965.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1965 n.1.
170. Id. at 1965–66.
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171

consistency . . . honesty and competence” in its workforce.
But
he criticized the majority’s response to the government’s needs as a
“winner-take-all” approach, and argued that this tactic was not
172
justified.
He believed the better approach would be to adopt an
even higher threshold for evaluating whether expressions made
173
pursuant to job responsibilities are protected. He outlined a new
threshold inquiry: a public employee who speaks pursuant to his
job responsibilities would only receive First Amendment protection
when “he speaks on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies
174
high standards of responsibility in the way he does it.”
Justice Souter then attacked the majority’s rationale that
whistleblower statutes would sufficiently shield employees from
175
retaliatory action. He argued that the whistleblower laws provide
varying degrees of protection based on locality, and that the
Federal Circuit has interpreted the legislative enactments with
respect to federal employees as denying protection for statements
176
made in the course of one’s job responsibilities.
Therefore, he
contended, the laws relied on by the majority to protect employees
177
like Ceballos would not offer sufficient protection.
Finally, Justice Souter conveyed his dismay that the breadth of
the majority’s ruling could imperil academic freedom by
threatening college professors who inexorably make statements
178
and write articles as part and parcel of their employment.
In
response to this concern, Justice Kennedy asserted that academic
freedom issues raised additional constitutional considerations that
do not fall within the purview of the Court’s public-employee free
speech cases; thus the Court passed on deciding whether the
179
Garcetti ruling applied to such cases.
Justices Stevens and Breyer each wrote separate dissenting
opinions. Both disagreed with the majority’s categorical rule.
Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority’s rule instructs public
employees who wish to receive First Amendment protection to go

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 1967.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1970.
Id. at 1970–71.
Id. at 1971.
Id. at 1969–70.
Id. at 1962.
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180

directly to the public rather than to their supervisors.
He
181
believed this to be an unacceptable implication.
Justice Breyer
further added that lawyers’ professional obligations require them
to speak out under certain circumstances, and where that is the
case, the government’s interest in prohibiting that speech is
182
weakened.
IV. THE PROBLEM
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti provided guidance to
the lower courts that when a public employee brings a suit alleging
that an adverse employment action violated his or her First
Amendment rights, the claim should be automatically discarded if
the speech for which the employee was terminated was made in the
course of the employee’s duties, notwithstanding the importance of
183
the statement to the general public.
Garcetti effectively
eliminated the public concern threshold test and the Pickering
balancing test for employment-related speech, a significant
doctrinal development. In laying down this absolute rule, the
majority offered three principal reasons. First, the government has
184
the right to control its employees’ speech;
second, public
employees have no personal stake in their job-related
185
and third, the fact that employees receive
expressions;
whistleblower protection for exposing government misconduct
186
renders further judicial protection unnecessary.
Finally, while
not explicitly stated in the majority’s opinion, the rhetoric of the
majority appears to evince a latent concern with the potential for
187
increased litigation.
The ramifications of the Court’s decision
are alarming for several reasons.
A. The Government’s Interest
Throughout its history, the Court has ascribed different values
to different kinds of expression. Speech concerning public issues
has historically received the strongest constitutional protection,
180. Id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1974–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1960.
184. Id. at 1959–60.
185. Id. at 1960.
186. Id. at 1962.
187. See id. at 1961.
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while speech relating to personal matters has not received such
188
In Garcetti, the government argued, and
expansive safeguards.
the majority agreed, that First Amendment protection for public
employees’ job-related expressions is unwarranted, and to conclude
otherwise would undermine the government’s ability to effectively
189
manage its workforce and operate efficiently.
The ability of the
government to exert greater control over its employees’ speech
than over the speech of its citizenry has not been thoroughly
examined by the courts, but it has been generally accepted as
necessary in order for the government to perform its multitudinous
190
tasks.
To assess the cogency of this argument, one must recall the
historical rationale behind the ruling that certain restrictions on
public employees’ speech were permissible. These limitations had
their roots in the notion that the government must have full
authority to carry out its mandate to effectively serve the citizenry.
In order to fulfill this mandate, the Court has permitted the
government, as employer, to impose qualified limitations on the
191
free speech rights of public employees.
In many respects, this makes sense. A public employee who
brazenly speaks out against his colleagues or supervisors can
undermine the government’s effectiveness. The government
employer should be able to discipline or even terminate a
troublesome employee without fearing the consequences. Few
would argue that the government cannot take action against an
employee for offensive, indecent, or treacherous behavior. To
188. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)
(“[E]xpression on public issues has ‘always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
467 (1980)); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (“The public
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance—
the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment—is so
great . . . .”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating “debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (noting “speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government”), with Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1984) (stating “if [the expression] cannot be fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is
unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”). See also R.
George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27,
28–29 (1987).
189. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
190. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994).
191. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1968).
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hold otherwise might undermine government efficiency due to
resources that would necessarily be consumed in managing an
unruly employee and the diversion this would create from carrying
out the government’s important duties. Moreover, the separation
of powers between the executive and judicial branches requires
192
that the judiciary not micro-manage the government’s affairs.
But efficiency is not the sole objective of a governmental
system, and the value of protecting constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms should not be underestimated. The law should work to
provide an environment in which the government can function
effectively, while simultaneously guaranteeing the protection of
individual and collective liberties and rights. As recognized in
Pickering and its progeny, the interest in efficiency must at times
give way to the interest in preserving a fundamental liberty.
Indeed, a strong argument exists that providing public
employees First Amendment protection will enhance the
government’s effectiveness.
The Supreme Court long ago
recognized that “informed public opinion is the most potent of all
193
restraints upon misgovernment . . . .” Human experience teaches
that those who expect their actions to be subject to subsequent
examination may well proceed with greater caution. Under this
supposition, when government workers are aware that their actions
may be subject to public scrutiny, they will labor more effectively.
When public employees are functioning at their best, the
government, in turn, will benefit. Permitting government agencies
to shield themselves from scrutiny by allowing them to clamp down
on the free speech rights of their employees deprives the citizenry
of a useful mechanism of monitoring the government and can lead
to an unchecked and mismanaged system of public service.
Providing the public with information on the government’s affairs
sends a clear message that the actions of government employees
are not beyond public scrutiny.
Without such information, the public is denied the
opportunity to assess whether its government is operating
effectively. Unlike private companies, the government does not
192. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (stating that when public employees’ speech is
unrelated to a matter of public concern, the judiciary should not intrude on the
government’s duties in the name of the First Amendment, and also asserting that
ordinary dismissals from government service, while perhaps unfair, are not subject
to judicial review even in those situations where the dismissal may be improper or
unreasonable).
193. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
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have indicia such as stock prices, dividends, or rankings to gauge its
performance, or specific shareholders to whom it is accountable—
the government’s shareholders are the members of the public.
Encouraging public employees to speak out against improper
behavior can drive out inefficiencies that might otherwise plague
an unmonitored government. Discouraging public employees
from commenting on unethical practices will make it more difficult
for government officers to understand where the problems lie,
thereby impeding progress towards a better-functioning
government.
As Justice Stevens commented in his dissent, the majority’s
ruling creates a perverse incentive for employees who notice
wrongdoing to take these concerns to the media or directly to the
194
public.
Such a disclosure might subsequently create a public
relations havoc for the government, forcing it to consume far more
resources than if it had been initially responsive to the employee’s
allegation.
As previously alluded to, there is a direct correlation between
the public’s perception of information disclosure and the public’s
trust in its government. A government shrouded in secrecy will
195
confirm suspicions that the government cannot be trusted, and
undermine the notion that government exists for the people’s
benefit. A transparent government, on the other hand, conveys
196
legitimacy and helps to maintain public confidence in the system.
Insofar as the government promotes policies that foster
transparency, the result will yield an increase in the public’s faith in
the system. The upshot of a confident body politic is increased
participation, robust economic development, and an orderly
197
society that complies with the rule of law.
B. The Public’s Interest
Central to the Court’s rulings in Pickering and Connick was the

194. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1963 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. William Mock, On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational Choice
Discussion of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 1069, 1091 (1999) (“Many people do not trust governments, in general, or their
own governments, in particular. Whatever they hear from governments is
suspect . . . .”).
196. See id. at 1091–92 (discussing transparency in government as being
essential for the public’s trust).
197. See id at 1096–99.
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interest of the public; specifically, the value to society of hearing
198
The Court asserted that
the government employee’s views.
“speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
199
the essence of self-government.”
In fact, the Court’s decision to permit certain free speech
rights was grounded in the belief that public employees may be in
the best position to have informed opinions about government
operations, to understand how the government can operate more
200
effectively, and to observe and report misconduct.
Public
reception of such information leads to a more informed citizenry
that is better equipped to make knowledgeable decisions about its
201
government.
Yet Garcetti instructs that government employees
receive the least protection when they are speaking on subjects that
they know best. The Garcetti holding, then, compared with that in
Rankin, creates a contradiction. It is debatable whether the average
person would be concerned about a given public employee’s
202
attitude toward the president.
It seems more likely that the
public would be interested in hearing the public employee’s views
on abusive practices in the system.
This public benefit factor is virtually ignored by the Garcetti
203
majority.
A review of the lower court decisions in publicemployee free speech cases reveals that the content of the speaker’s
expression has been the determinative factor in deciding whether
the speech is protected. Recall the Connick court’s formulation:
198. The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, supra note 46, at 1739.
199. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
200. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 228 (1974); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968).
201. See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1016 (2005) (“[T]he First Amendment allows open discussion
and criticism of governmental policies and practices and thereby creates the
conditions enabling an informed and critical electorate. In other words, coupled
with the right to vote, the First Amendment provides a means by which the
citizenry can ‘check’ and ultimately direct governmental power.”).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 77–81. See also Cynthia K. Y. Lee,
Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern Requirement,
76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1988).
203. While the majority did make mention of the benefits to the public from
hearing the opinions of government employees, it essentially discounted this
factor by ruling that the speaker’s role, citizen or employee, was dispositive. If the
speaker’s expressions were made pursuant to his or her employment, the majority
apparently believed the value to the public of that expression to be irrelevant;
rather, the majority concluded that a public employer has complete “control over
what the employer itself has commissioned or created.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126
S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
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where the employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern,
and more specifically, where the expression “bring[s] to light
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the
204
part of [a government official],” that speech should be protected,
205
in large part because of its benefit to the public.
But according
to Garcetti, even speech on crucial public issues is not protected;
rather, the role of the speaker is the determinative factor.
Retroactively applying the Garcetti rule to earlier lower court cases
illustrates the certain loss of valuable information, such as reports
206
regarding police brutality and misconduct in public schools.
To understand why such information is virtually guaranteed to
be suppressed, consider the importance of employment to
individuals and families. Post-Garcetti, public employees who
choose to speak critically will likely suffer reprisal, thereby
jeopardizing their well-being and the well-being of their families.
Rather than risk these consequences, many employees will simply
keep quiet in the face of wrongdoing. The eventual result could be
a culture of silence in the government workplace where
misconduct goes unreported. Public employees may turn a blind
eye to wrongdoing and those employees responsible for monitoring
and reporting workplace concerns may refrain from making critical
204. 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
205. See id. The Connick Court decided that Myers’s survey did not constitute a
matter of public concern, and based this decision on the fact that if it were
released to the public, it would not convey any information of value to the public;
see also Lee, supra note 201, at 1134 (“[F]ree expression and specifically public
employee speech are so valuable to society that courts should ensure their
protection . . . .”).
206. In Taylor v. Keith, two police officers, pursuant to an internal investigation
and within the scope of their employment duties, were retaliated against after
expressing concern over the brutal conduct of a fellow police officer toward a
citizen. 338 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit held the officers’
statements were entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 641. In Canary v.
Osborn, the Appellate Court rejected a public employer’s summary judgment
motion where an assistant principal was demoted for revealing a conspiracy among
school administrators to cheat on student achievement tests. 211 F.3d 324 (6th
Cir. 2000). In another case involving the statements of a police officer, the
plaintiff was reassigned to a lower position after refusing to comply with a directive
to include statements which he knew to be false in an official police report and
subsequently attempting to bring to light exculpatory evidence in a case that the
district attorney was prosecuting. Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.
1998). In each of these cases, the protected speech was made in the course of the
speaker’s employment. But under the new Garcetti ruling, such statements would
not receive protection. Therefore, police officers who report brutality or rogue
behavior, or teachers or school administrators who report misconduct on the job,
will not receive protection for speaking out.
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comments, even though this is exactly what their job requires.
Public employees, whose salaries are paid with taxpayer
dollars, should be accountable primarily to the citizens they serve,
and only secondarily to their employer. As such, public employees
should have not only the right, but also the duty to report fraud,
waste, and abusive behavior, because unless an employee discloses
wrongdoing, these practices may go undetected. Encouraging
public employees to make early disclosures of misconduct can help
to curb abuse before it becomes unmanageable, thereby providing
a tangible benefit to taxpayers.
Thus, there are two reasons favoring policies that protect the
free speech rights of public employees. First, a reduction in these
rights corresponds to a decrease in information that would
otherwise be available to citizens. Second, maintaining free speech
rights provides the possibility of early detection of government
wrongdoing which serves the public interest by minimizing the
detrimental impact. Threatening public employees with retaliatory
employment action is contrary to both of these interests.
C. The Individual’s Interests
The government’s argument, with which the majority agrees—
that the individual’s interest is irrelevant—is highly problematic.
Its distinction between an actor as a citizen and an actor as an
207
employee is unfounded. To begin with, the underlying values of
the First Amendment—“self-fulfillment, the advancement of
knowledge and the discovery of truth, and preservation of an
208
informed electorate” —are the same irrespective of whether the
209
Even the
actor is speaking as an employee or as a citizen.
government acknowledges the dual benefits of serving as a public
employee: an exciting career coupled with the opportunity to make
210
a difference for the nation.
207. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959–61.
208. Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of
Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government
Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 709–10 (1984).
209. Id.
210. USAJobs is the official site of federal employee job listings for the U.S.
Government. The site includes the following phrases: “Make a difference in the
lives of the American public” and “Being a civil servant is a demanding, yet
rewarding, job.” USAJobs, Working for America, http://www.usajobs.gov/first
timers.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
For the Federal Government to be efficient and effective, it needs the
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Assume for a moment that the majority’s argument is correct
and that Ceballos “did not act as a citizen” when he performed his
job, but rather merely as a disinterested employee who was simply
carrying out orders. This creates the impression that public
employees are essentially puppets under the control of their
employers. Yet the numerous examples of government employees
refusing to obey the inappropriate directives of their superiors
proves that government employees play more than just the role of
211
“employee” as public servants.
Another factor—the pay differential between employees in the
public and private sectors—rebuts the presumption that there is no
aspect of self-gratification that commands First Amendment
212
protection. “Individuals do not shed their personal identities on
213
the job” nor should we promote a rule that encourages them to
do so. It is in society’s best interest to unite the actor as citizen and
as employee so that the upstanding values the citizen brings to his
or her job are not stifled.
D. Are Whistleblower Protections Adequate?
The majority justified its holding by stating that the “powerful
best and the brightest employees who want to serve their fellow
countrymen and who are willing to share their knowledge, their skills,
and their energy for the betterment of our nation. The contributions
Federal employees make today, tomorrow, and in the future guarantee
that America will remain the world leader and can successfully respond
to the foreign and domestic challenges of the 21st century. . . . And then
there’s the satisfaction that comes from knowing that you are making a
difference.
USAJobs, Working for America, http://www.usajobs.gov/working.asp (last visited
Sept. 28, 2006).
211. Consider the following examples: David Hackworth was a decorated
Vietnam War veteran who returned to the United States after four tours of duty.
He spoke out against the Vietnam War, alerting the public that the war could not
be won. His superiors moved to court-martial him, but he eventually resigned with
an honorable discharge. Douglas Martin, David H. Hackworth—Colonel in Vietnam,
Columnist, S. F. CHRON., May 7, 2005, at B5, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/05/07/BAG78CLMMH1.DTL. Coleen Rowley, a
career FBI agent, wrote a memo to the head of the FBI that criticized the FBI’s
culture and asserted that the FBI missed a crucial opportunity to discover the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks before they took place. James Kuhnhenn, FBI
‘Careerists’ Stalled Terror Case, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), June 7, 2002, at A1.
212. Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, State Employee Pay Growth Below
Inflation Rate for Third Straight Year (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.aft.org/
presscenter/releases/2006/090406.htm.
213. Cheh, supra note 208, at 710.
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network of legislative enactments” at the local, state, and federal
214
levels provides sufficient protection to whistleblowers. There are
certain statutory protections for government whistleblowers, such
as the Civil Service Reform Act, enacted by Congress in 1978 to
215
protect federal employees.
Then in 1989, Congress passed the
Whistleblower Protection Act, which intended to augment the
previous legislation and afford protection for federal employees
who assist in the elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, illegality, and
216
corruption.
But a recent report by the Congressional Research
Service admits that “[e]nacting statutory rights for whistleblowers
. . . have not produced the protections that some expected. . . .
[T]he agencies created by Congress to safeguard the rights of
whistleblowers [] have not in many cases provided the anticipated
217
protections to federal employees.”
Current case law creates an extremely high bar for employees
to overcome before they can succeed on a whistleblower claim.
The courts have placed the burden squarely on the employee by
asserting that there is a “presumption that public officers perform
their duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in accordance with
218
the law and governing regulations” and that this presumption can
219
only be contradicted with “irrefragable proof.” Furthermore, the
220
recent decisions have denied whistleblower
Federal Circuit’s
protections to employees who complained directly to their
221
222
supervisors.
In Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management, the
Federal Circuit already ruled that whistleblower protections do not
protect public employees whose disclosures of potential

214. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006).
215. Cong. Research Serv. Report for Cong., National Security Whistleblowers
2, http://www.pogo.org/m/gp/gp-crs-nsw-12302005.pdf (Dec. 30, 2005)
[hereinafter CRS Report].
216. Id. at 20.
217. Id. at 2.
218. Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
219. Id.
220. The Federal Circuit is one of the three agencies responsible for
adjudicating whistleblower claims. The other two are the Merit Systems Protection
Board and the Office of Special Counsel. CRS Report, supra note 215, at 2.
221. Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that an
employee’s disclosure of potential unethical practices to his supervisors is not
protected by whistleblower statutes); Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (denying whistleblower protection to a public employee who
complained directly to the alleged wrongdoer).
222. 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 8
13. HARRIS - RC.DOC

1176

4/10/2007 1:05:51 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3
223

misconduct are made in the course of their employment duties.
As a county employee, Ceballos was not eligible for federal
whistleblower protection, but he may have relied on California’s
whistleblower statute to shield him from retaliation. But Ceballos
was not eligible for whistleblower protection under the state statute
because, at the time of his actions, the state law required that the
224
disclosure be made to an external public body such as the media.
Ceballos instead sought First Amendment protection that was
subsequently denied by the Court, in part because it erroneously
believed he could still avail himself of the state’s whistleblower
225
protection.
The Garcetti case, thus, makes federal and state
whistleblower protections even more important, since the
employee is no longer entitled to First Amendment protection—
particularly for communications made internally and in the course
and scope of an employee’s authority.
226
But the statutory protections are not uniform, and public
employees may receive different treatment depending on their
place of residence and their level of government employment. The
current statutory enactments are inadequate and superficial, and
the judicial protections are no better. Thus, while the majority may
believe that whistleblower statutes afford public employees ample
protection, the reality belies this argument. This begs the question:
prior to Garcetti, public employees have spoken critically in the
course of their employment responsibilities with nothing other
than whistleblower protections (which clearly are limited and
arguably arbitrary)—will Garcetti even have an impact then?
The answer to this is twofold. First, any abridgment on an
individual’s free speech rights must be adequately justified. The
Constitution guarantees free speech protections, but the courts
have imposed certain reasonable restrictions on the First
Amendment rights of public employees to promote government
efficiency. That much seems to be reasonable. Regardless of its
actual impact, the ruling sends a message that the government, as
223. Id. at 1353–54.
224. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (2003).
225. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006).
226. What Price Free Speech: Whistleblowers and the Garcetti v. Ceballos Decision
Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 261 (2006) (statement of
Stephen M. Kohn, Chair, National Whisteblowers Center), available at http://
whistleblowers.org/Ceballos.final.testimony.pdf (examining the whistleblower
statutes in all fifty states and concluding that the “powerful network” referred to by
the Garcetti majority simply does not exist). Id. at 5–6.
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an employer, can retaliate against its employees who do not agree
with its message. Surely, this contention is not consistent with the
principles of democracy upon which this country was founded.
Second, it is likely that public employees are aware of
whistleblower protections generally, but perhaps not aware of their
specific characteristics. Public employees, confronted with a grave
situation and desiring to act honorably, may make a disclosure
presuming that they will somehow be protected, either
constitutionally or by statute. Before Garcetti, if the whistleblower
did not realize that he or she did not qualify for statutory
protection, the employee could always file suit alleging a
constitutional violation. Others might have been aware of the
vagaries in the laws, but may not have been willing to test their
boundaries. But the Garcetti ruling leaves no room for ambiguity:
absent statutory protections, public employees’ job-related
statements receive no protection. Public employees who may have
previously come forward will no longer be likely to do so.
E. An Issue Left Unanswered: The Impact on Academics
In his dissent, Justice Souter expressed concern over the
breadth of the Garcetti ruling, particularly the potential impact on
227
college professors.
He observed that the Court has invariably
held that the writings and speeches of academics occupy a unique
position in the constitutional landscape and as such, have enjoyed
228
expansive First Amendment freedoms.
The majority responded
that the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the First Amendment
rights of university professors involved considerations beyond that
229
of cases related to public employees.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the free speech
doctrine and academics has not been clearly defined by the
230
Supreme Court. Add to this uncertainty the fact that the Garcetti
appellate court’s special concurrence by Judge O’Scannlain
231
(adopted by the Garcetti Supreme Court majority) relied heavily
227. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1969–70 (2006) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1962 (majority opinion).
230. Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 GREEN BAG 17, 18
(2005) (“Courts need an effective doctrinal framework for adjudicating [academic
freedom] disputes. They do not have one.”).
231. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1187-88, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004)
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232

on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Urofsky v. Gilmore, in which
the plaintiffs were six professors employed by various collegiate233
level schools throughout Virginia. That case involved a challenge
to the constitutionality of a Virginia statute restricting all state
employees from accessing sexually explicit materials on the state’s
234
computers.
The professors objected to the statute on grounds
that their compliance with it necessarily infringed their academic
freedom rights and thus their ability to perform their employment
235
duties.
While the Fourth Circuit recognized the importance of
academic freedom to the American democracy, it maintained that
the distinction between the individual’s First Amendment rights as
a citizen as compared to that of an employee was nonetheless
236
relevant.
Now that the Garcetti Court has validated this distinction with
regard to public-employee speech, the next step may well be to
extend this analysis to the speech of academics. With regard to
university professors, this distinction is again problematic because
the scope of what constitutes employee speech versus citizen
speech is not clear. Teachers’ in-class statements might be
considered within the scope of their employment, but the line is
not so clear with regard to other aspects of many professors’ jobs,
237
such as delivering lectures, publishing articles, and writing books.
Given the Garcetti majority’s deft ability to limit the application
of the Pickering and Connick tests, the Court may be able to do it
again. Using Garcetti as its backdrop, the Court might begin such
an inquiry at a similar starting point: whether college professors’
job-related statements are made pursuant to their roles as
professors or their role as citizens. The dichotomy drawn by the
majority in Garcetti has potentially detrimental implications for
academics. As a result, this issue is worthy of close monitoring.
(O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring), overruled by Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct.
1951 (2006).
232. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
233. Id. at 404.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 406, 410 n.9. The plaintiffs maintained that the statute inhibited
their ability to teach and research. Id. The complaint alleged numerous
restrictions on the plaintiff’s job duties, including validating student research on
teacher-assigned tasks, and conducting independent research. Id.
236. See generally id. at 414 (rejecting academic freedom as a “right” and
discussing the notion that, insofar as such rights are recognized, they are
institutional rights as opposed to individual rights).
237. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 230.
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What Is Fair?

Undoubtedly, a critical aspect of our legal system should be to
238
promote fairness, both to serve the societal good, but also to
239
preserve the public’s confidence in the judiciary.
To that end,
the legal system should advocate rules that are consistent with the
public’s notions of fairness, particularly where there is likely some
public consensus about what the rules should be.
Given the choice between an open and accountable
government on the one hand, and an opaque and sealed
government on the other, most people would certainly choose the
240
former. As one scholar noted:
By any commonsense estimation, governmental
transparency, defined broadly as a governing institution’s
openness to the gaze of others, is clearly among the
pantheon of great political virtues. A fundamental
attribute of democracy, a norm of human rights, a tool to
promote political and economic prosperity and to curb
corruption, and a means to enable effective relations
between nation states, transparency appears to provide
such a remarkable array of benefits that no right-thinking
politician, administrator, policy wonk, or academic could
238. For a detailed discussion on the notion of fairness in the legal system, see
generally Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2002)
(rejecting the suggestion that analysts of legal policy should rely exclusively on
economic considerations in making decisions and must bear in mind societal
notions of fairness).
239. The judicial branch has few means to execute its judgments. As a result,
the public’s opinion of judicial decisions, particularly with respect to whether the
decisions are fair, is integral to the judiciary’s effective disposition. As Justice
Frankfurter once noted, “The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse
nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral
sanction.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Court should not decide a racial gerrymandering case because
it was a political question); see also Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 59 n.171 (2002) (“An
essential condition for an independent judiciary is public confidence. . . . Without
public confidence the judiciary cannot operate . . . . [P]ublic confidence in the
judiciary is the most precious asset that this branch of government has. It is also
one of the most precious assets of the nation.”).
240. Consider the alternative to an open and transparent government: “a
government riddled with autocracy, corruption, or incompetence [in which] an
open information policy would be unwelcome.” Mock, supra note 195, at 1091; see
also Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 898–99 (2006)
(“[O]pen government produces an informed and interested public, and by
implication . . . secrecy caused by opaque or closed government produces
suspicious and/or ignorant masses.”).
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241

be against it.
Indeed, the Framers’ aversion toward an abusive government
was the driving force behind the Constitution as written. Policies
that encourage transparency in government would therefore be
favored over policies that promote silence on the part of public
servants.
The Garcetti ruling cannot be squared with the principles
underlying an open, accountable, and transparent government. By
sanctioning the termination of employees who speak out, the
ruling discourages employees from being candid in the workplace,
thereby promoting silence and secrecy, ultimately creating a more
centralized power structure. Government secrecy diminishes its
242
accountability to the public and an increased centralization of
243
government power can lead to corruption and irresponsibility.
As one federal circuit judge eloquently noted, “[d]emocracies die
behind closed doors . . . . When government begins closing doors,
it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the
244
people. Selective information is misinformation.” Thus an open
government is instrumental to maintaining a strong democracy,
particularly with respect to unelected public officials, who are
insulated from voter referendums; openness is essential in order to
ensure accountability by government decision makers.
After Garcetti, the picture is clear: the government is
substantially insulated from liability for misconduct. By permitting
retaliation against employees who attempt to expose government
wrongdoing and denying the public access to that information, the
government has isolated itself from public inquiry. Since the
public would surely be in favor of rules that exposed corruption or
immoral behavior in their government, it follows that a rule which
tolerates retaliatory action against a civic-minded employee who
speaks out for the public’s benefit does not comport with societal
expectations of fairness. Therefore, Garcetti is inconsistent with the
241. Mock, supra note 195 at 888–89. The article also discusses the manifold
benefits of transparency including as a predicate for effective representative
government, permitting the free flow of information thereby allowing input, and
examination and evaluation by the citizenry resulting in an increase in the quality
of government. Id. at 898–900.
242. Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1115, 1125 (2002).
243. Malcolm Wallop, The Centralization of Power and Governmental
Unaccountability, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487 (1995).
244. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
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public’s welfare.
G. Should the Court Have Used a Heightened Standard?
Less than ten years ago, the Court in United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) was deeply concerned about the
impact of its ruling because of the thousands of employees that
245
would be affected. The NTEU Court also featured prominently in
246
its decision the public’s rights to receive the employee’s views. In
that case, the Court maintained that the government would prevail
only if it could demonstrate that its interests in operating an
effective public service system outweighed the interests of both the
prospective audiences and the current and future public
247
248
employees’ interest in that expression.
That much is familiar,
but the Court noted two additional considerations that gave rise to
a modified standard favoring public employees: first, it asserted
that because the ban had an impact on vast numbers of employees,
the concerns were much more serious than the impact of a single
employment decision; second, the Court observed that in contrast
to a single employment action made in response to an employee’s
statements, the ban was damaging because it had the potential to
249
discourage employees from speaking in the future. It stated that
prospective limitations on the speech of public employees weighed
heavily “on the public’s right to read and hear what the employees
250
would otherwise have written and said.”
As a result, the Court
imposed a much heavier burden on the government to prove the
251
salutary nature of the ban.
While the NTEU court made it clear that its modified standard
252
was not applicable in post hoc Pickering analysis cases,
its
positioning of the societal advantages of employees’ opinions
suggests that additional weight should be afforded to the public
interest factor when the employee’s speech provides information
253
from which the public will benefit.
Here, Ceballos’s statements

245. See 513 U.S. 454, 466–68, (1995).
246. Id. at 470. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
247. 513 U.S. 454 at 468.
248. The test set forth in NTEU was essentially the Pickering balancing test.
249. Id. at 467–68.
250. Id. at 470.
251. Id. at 468.
252. Id. at 467.
253. See id. at 467–68.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

39

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 8
13. HARRIS - RC.DOC

1182

4/10/2007 1:05:51 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

had the potential to supply the public with valuable information.
Therefore, the Court should have considered the enormous
potential loss of valuable information as well as the far-reaching
consequences of an unqualified ruling.
Had the Court
contemplated these implications, it might have reached a different
result.
But the Garcetti Court never publicly considered applying a
heightened standard. Surely the majority realized that its ruling
was more than simply a judgment against Ceballos, but regarding
all public employees. Recognition of this factor would have at least
assuaged the concerns of the millions of public employees affected
and those of free speech advocates, that the Court appreciated the
extent of its ruling, nevertheless, it reached the conclusion that the
speech should not be protected. But the breadth of its ruling is not
contemplated in the majority’s opinion, and as such, the opinion
lacks legitimacy.
H. The Majority’s Concern Regarding Excessive Litigation Is Unjustified
The majority appeared concerned that the uncertainty created
by the balancing test would generate a large volume of claims by
254
disgruntled employees. This concern is neither well-founded nor
persuasive. For almost forty years, the federal courts have operated
under the Pickering constructs. There is no evidence that the courts
255
have been debilitated with such litigation.
Furthermore, the
Supreme Court itself has rejected this same argument advanced by
256
a notable defendant.
“Most frivolous and vexatious litigation is
terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with
little if any personal involvement by the defendant . . . . Moreover,
the availability of sanctions provides a significant deterrent to
257
litigation . . . .”
In applying the new Garcetti rule, the lower courts must still
determine whether the speech is a part of the speaker’s job or is

254. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
255. Justice Souter’s response to the majority included a count of such claims:
each year, there were approximately one hundred cases in the federal district
courts, and seventy in the federal courts of appeal. Id. at 1968 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
256. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997) (dismissing the President’s
argument that disallowing him absolute immunity from civil liability would lead to
an aggrandizement in the number of private lawsuits filed against the President).
257. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12, 56).
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258

outside the scope of his or her duties.
This inquiry requires fact
determinations and is no less onerous than the pre-Garcetti
standard; therefore, this issue is likely to be a battleground in
future cases.
Additionally, the shame and embarrassment public employees
confront after revealing misconduct is another factor that
259
discourages them from stepping forward.
As one legal scholar
noted: “There is something in our culture that holds most of us
back from blowing whistles and also from pursuing legal remedies
260
even when we feel we are abused in an employment situation.”
For the aforementioned reasons, the majority’s concern that the
judiciary will be deluged with litigation of public employees’ claims
is unconvincing.
Even Justice Souter argues that the standard in such disputes
should be more stringent allowing only “matter[s] of unusual
261
importance” to proceed. But in order to justify the adoption of a
new standard after more than twenty-five years, the Court should
ensure that the standard provides sufficient additional clarity.
Generally, matters of public concern are inherently important.
Whether they are unusually important would likely be difficult to
ascertain at the initial stage; and in any case, the Pickering calculus
dictates that the competing interests be measured, thus providing
the opportunity for judicious balancing. Foreclosing the
employee’s right to seek a legal remedy due to concerns that overly
litigious employees will cripple government effectiveness is tenuous
at best.
I. The Pickering/Connick Standard Should Not Have Been Abandoned
It is beyond doubt that the government should be afforded a
certain degree of discretion to manage its workforce. Yet this need
258. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting).
259. In Professor Chemerinsky’s analysis of the Los Angeles Police
Department, he observed that officers are discouraged from speaking out, but if
an officer gets so frustrated that he or she decides to step forward, that officer is
marked as a traitor and is subjected to retaliatory actions that are often overlooked
by supervisors and colleagues. Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 561–62; see also
Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 359 (1991) (“[T]he world has not been
kind to whistleblowers. In fact, whistleblowers are hated, harassed and vilified.”).
260. John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law, 19 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
585, 589 (1992).
261. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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is not so compelling that it requires all future claims of workplace
retaliation (for statements made pursuant to an employee’s job) to
be barred, because on the other side of the scale lie substantial
interests as well. Every individual has a personal stake in his or her
government and community. Individuals who choose public sector
employment often do so in order to make a positive impact on
society. After Garcetti, an employee who discovers wrongdoing in
the workplace has two options: keep quiet or speak out and risk
retaliation.
The Court could have reached the same result in Garcetti by
employing the Pickering balancing test. Recall the factors that the
Court considers on the employer’s side of the scale: the likelihood
that the speech will undermine the agency’s operations, foster
262
controversy among co-workers, or disrupt the workplace.
The
defendants need not prove that Ceballos’s memo actually disrupted
263
the workplace, but merely that such potential existed.
If this
were the case, the Court could have upheld the county’s
disciplinary action against Ceballos without laying down a
categorical rule.
Recognition of the government’s important interests is
embodied in the Pickering and Connick tests; and the Court has
erected other obstacles that proscribe many employer-employee
264
disputes.
Because these tests adequately accommodated the
county’s needs, the Garcetti Court’s radical departure on a
constitutional question of such paramount importance was not
warranted.
The Court’s judgment in Garcetti is a policy choice about the
value of public-employee speech, but even more importantly, about
the government’s inherent powers. By portraying the absolute
control over public-employee speech as necessary to operate
262. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571, 573 (1968).
263. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).
264. Under the Pickering/Connick test, the public employee must first prove
that his or her speech is on a matter of public concern before the Court will
perform the balancing of interests. Id. at 146. Even where the speech is deemed
to address a matter of public concern, the court may determine that the statement
is so disruptive of the government’s ability to operate that it cannot be protected.
Id. at 151–52. Moreover, lack of a causal connection may warrant the case’s
dismissal. Id. at 153–54. And if the employer can prove it would have taken the
adverse employment action despite the employee’s speech, then the speech is
technically protected, but the case is dismissed because the status of the speech is
no longer relevant. Id. In short, a public employee bringing a lawsuit alleging a
violation of his or her First Amendment right must surmount numerous obstacles.
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effectively, the Garcetti court and the government have, for the
moment anyway, side-stepped the serious questions about whether
this ruling serves the best interests of the individual employee, the
public at large, and even the government itself.
With the Garcetti decision, absent sufficient statutory
protections, the government has virtually unlimited powers to
terminate or demote employees for speaking critically in the
workplace. By the breadth of its scope, this ruling creates a chilling
effect on employees and makes them less likely to expose
government fraud, waste, or abuse, because of the risk of dismissal.
As Justice Marshall once wrote, this danger “hangs over [public
employees’] heads like a sword of Damocles, threatening them with
dismissal for any speech that might impair the ‘efficiency of the
service’ . . . . [F]or the value of a sword of Damocles is that it
265
hangs—not that it drops.”
V. CONCLUSION
The tension between the interests of the individual, the
government, and the public has been the subject of a succession of
public-employee free speech cases heard by the Supreme Court
over the past forty years. The Garcetti decision is not within the
contemplation of existing precedent on such cases.
The Court’s holding upsets a relatively sound balance and is
imposed at the expense of not just Ceballos alone, but also future
public employees who will be dissuaded from reporting
misconduct. While many public employees should be lauded for
their courageous efforts to step forward and inform the public
about their government’s affairs, these employees will now either
refrain from doing so or be punished.
To correct the majority’s ruling, Congress should introduce
and pass legislation to close the loophole created by Garcetti and to
provide statutory protections that the majority apparently believes
266
already exist.

265.
266.

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
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